The risk of a tyranny of the referendum
How far can national referendums expand before popular sovereignty begins to undermine representation itself?
🔍 WHY THIS STORY MATTERS
France’s 2027 debate is turning the referendum into a central constitutional question. The stakes extend beyond participation: rules on rights, turnout, repetition and agenda-setting determine whether direct democracy complements representative government or competes with it.
KEY TAKEAWAYS...
● A ‘Référendum Citoyen’ project seeks much greater citizen control over which questions reach a national vote.
● Direct democracy creates opposite risks though: temporary majorities can overpower minorities, while low participation can magnify highly mobilised minorities.
● Far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon proposes stronger direct citizen powers, but within a wider institutional system that retains and strengthens the state.
● Switzerland shows that extensive direct democracy can function, but within representative institutions, procedural thresholds and constitutional safeguards.
F rench writer and activist Alexandre Jardin’s ‘Référendum Citoyen’ project starts from a genuine democratic frustration. Many French voters feel distant from institutions and want a more direct say between elections.
Alexandre Jardin and his son Robinson have built an online platform around that demand, aiming for one million registered users and eventually allowing citizens themselves to submit propositions. Le Monde reported on 18 October that the two men present the project as a way of returning power to the people on almost every subject.
If elected representatives appear unable to settle major disputes, why not let citizens decide directly? But the more referendums move from being an occasional constitutional instrument to a routine method of government, the more difficult the institutional questions become.
Tyranny of the majority
The first is the classic tyranny of the majority. Democracy depends on majority rule, but constitutional democracy does not normally assume that 50% plus one should possess unlimited power. Fundamental rights, courts and constitutional procedures exist partly because temporary majorities can impose lasting costs on minorities that cannot protect themselves through numbers alone.
France’s Constitution already reflects that distinction. Article 11 defines the areas in which a referendum can be used, while Article 89 governs constitutional revision. The presidential campaign has revived arguments over whether referendum powers should be expanded, but “let the people decide” does not answer what may legitimately be decided by a bare majority.
